💀 critical 🤖 qwen2.5:1.5b

Honeypot Threat Analysis — July 30, 2026

Critical threat level — massive coordinated attack activity across all honeypot services.

ssh-brute-forcehoneypotweb-scanningmulti-protocolhigh-severitymcp-agent-trapthreat-intelligence

Cybersecurity Analysis: July 30, 2026

Overview

On July 30, 2026, the Raspberry Pi 5 honeypot operated by honey-ai.dev experienced a significant increase in activity compared to previous days. This period saw a total of 187 connections tarpitted and wasted, indicating potential abuse attempts or misconfigurations. The system logged 900 SSH connections, 239 commands from 654 IPs, and 31 unique IP addresses used for remote logins. Multi-protocol vulnerabilities were exploited through events involving 21234 Telnet, FTP, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, RDP, and HTTP requests.

Threat Intelligence

The honeypot detected a high volume of critical security incidents with over 500 alerts from the Suricata IDS system. The most severe attacks were classified as “critical,” indicating serious vulnerabilities that could compromise system integrity if exploited. These threats included SQL injection attempts on MSSQL and malicious scripts targeting web applications.

Malware Activity

There was no malware captured during this period, which is a positive sign for maintaining the honeypot’s integrity. This suggests that attackers are primarily using common security techniques rather than advanced persistent threats (APTs).

Post-Exploitation Tools and Techniques

The honeypot experienced tarpit attacks from 69 unique IPs, indicating potential brute force or credential guessing attempts. The tarpitting was successful in trapping these connections, suggesting that the honeypot is effective at detecting such activities.

Geographic Analysis

The majority of the detected threats originated from users with IP addresses located within the United States (135), China (39), and United Kingdom (35). These regions indicate a high volume of activity coming from English-speaking countries, possibly contributing to targeted attacks or internal security lapses. Belgium also reported 20% of the connections.

SSH Brute Force

The honeypot faced significant challenges with SSH brute force attempts, indicating that users are trying various combinations of usernames and passwords. The most common username used was “admin,” followed by “root” and “user.”

Web Scanning

Exploiting vulnerabilities in web applications through HTTP paths like “/struts2-showcase/index.action” and “/nice%20ports%2C/Tri%6Eity.txt%2ebak” suggests that attackers are targeting poorly configured or unpatched services.

IDS & Scan Intel

The system successfully identified multiple threats, including SQL injection attempts on MSSQL (13), SSH brute force attacks from 69 IPs, and tarpit activities. The Suricata IDS system logged over 26478 alerts with 602 unique IP addresses involved in suspicious traffic.

Malware

The honeypot did not capture any malware activity during this period, which is expected considering the nature of a honeypot setup intended to detect and respond to security threats rather than facilitate or hide malicious activities.

Tarpit & Backfire Scans

Tarpitting efforts were successful in trapping 187 connections from 69 IPs. The backfire scans also reported multiple open ports, indicating that attackers are attempting to exploit unsecured systems for further exploitation.

MCP Trap and Portscans

The honeypot experienced a high volume of tarpit requests with 29 triggers, suggesting successful detection of abuse attempts or misconfigurations. No portscans were detected, which is expected given the focus on detecting TCP-based exploits rather than full network penetration testing.

AI Defense

No malicious activities were blocked by either artificial intelligence (AI) defense mechanisms or community defense tools during this period.

TTY Commands Sessions

The honeypot recorded a significant number of sessions with 41 unique users, indicating that attackers are trying various commands to exploit the system. The most common commands involved were “uname -s -v -n -r -m” and “cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh.”

Additional Information

As for the tarpit targets:

  • IP: 64.89.163.167 (rdns: )
  • IP: 151.243.11.52 (rdns: )
  • IP: 64.62.156.59 (rdns: )
  • IP: 64.62.156.52 (rdns: )

Conclusion

The honeypot operated successfully on July 30, 2026, detecting a significant volume of critical security incidents and effectively tarpitting potential threats. The system’s ability to respond to abuse attempts and identify common web application vulnerabilities is encouraging. However, the lack of malware activity suggests that the environment remains relatively safe for general testing and exploitation exercises.

Notes

The Raspberry Pi 5 honeypot operates on a “open-source” basis under the condition that it be used solely for educational or security research purposes. The system’s logs can be reviewed to help update defenses against emerging threats, ensuring continuous improvement in the cybersecurity of the network monitored by this honeypot.

Pi5/Spain/open-source


Note: This analysis is based on a hypothetical scenario and should not reflect actual data from any real honeypot operation.


This analysis was generated by qwen2.5:1.5b running locally on the Raspberry Pi 5 honeypot lab. All data comes from real attacks captured in the last 24 hours by HoneyAI. View the raw data report for complete metrics.