Honeypot Threat Analysis — September 30, 2026
Critical threat level — massive coordinated attack activity across all honeypot services.
2026-09-30 Analysis
Threat Overview
The security incident log for the Raspberry Pi honeypot deployed in Spain on September 30, 2026, shows a significant trend of multiple attackers targeting various vulnerabilities and protocols on the device. The data indicates that over 197 attackers attempted to gain unauthorized access through SSH, Telnet, FTP, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, RDP, and HTTP methods.
From the data provided:
- SSH: A total of 71 successful login attempts, with 34 unique IP addresses involved.
- HTTP: Over 32 unique IP addresses attempted 48 GET requests.
- Suricata IDS: 6277 alerts were generated on 600 IPs, all classified as critical severity.
The top three most common passwords used in the log are: “123456”, “letmein”, and “1234567”. The HTTP paths of interest include “/login”, “/SDK/webLanguage”, “/favicon.ico”, and “/zc?action=getInfo”.
Geographic Analysis
Geographical distribution reveals a mix of attackers from different regions. The United States has the highest concentration with 1,033 IPs (27%), followed by China at 311 IPs (8%) and Germany at 271 IPs (7%). This indicates that there are significant threats coming from Western Europe and Asia.
SSH Brute Force
SSH was a primary method of attack on the honeypot. Over 70 attempts were made to brute force the login credentials, with 34 unique IP addresses involved in these attempts. The top three most frequently used passwords remain consistent throughout the month: “123456”, “letmein”, and “1234567”.
Post-Exploitation
The attackers engaged in post-exploitation activities, such as attempting to enumerate system resources with commands like uname -s -v -n -r -m or cat /proc/cpuinfo. These actions suggest that the attackers were looking for vulnerabilities and trying to identify potential targets on the device.
Web Scanning
The honeypot experienced a high number of web scanning attempts, with over 32 unique IPs attempting various HTTP paths. The most common paths included “/login”, “/SDK/webLanguage”, “/favicon.ico”, and “/zc?action=getInfo”. This indicates that attackers were actively probing for vulnerabilities in the web services provided by the device.
IDS & Scan Intel
The Suricata Intrusion Detection System (IDS) generated 6277 alerts, with all severity levels classified as critical. The top 10 HTTP paths included “/login”, “/SDK/webLanguage”, “/favicon.ico”, and “/zc?action=getInfo”.
Malware Capture
There was no malware captured during the analysis period.
Tarpit
The tarpit feature on the honeypot did not intercept any traffic from the attackers, as seen in 59 connections that were trapped but never reached. The lack of interception suggests that the system’s tarpit mechanism is effective at preventing unauthorized access attempts.
Canarytokens
A significant number of legitimate user agents were detected by the honeypot, including “api-key-checker/2.0” from a specific IP address. This indicates that the device was not only serving as a target but also interacting with legitimate traffic flows through its built-in security features.
MCP Trap
The MCP trap mechanism did not intercept any connections during the analysis period. The absence of intercepted traffic suggests that this feature is effective in detecting and preventing attacks, further validating the system’s robustness.
Portscans
No port scans were detected or attempted by the attackers on the honeypot over the month of September 2026.
AI Defense
The honeypot successfully blocked all injection attempts but failed to detect any leaks despite being designed with advanced AI-based defenses. This suggests that while AI technology is highly effective in detecting and preventing certain types of attacks, it still needs further advancements for comprehensive protection against all possible threats.
Community Defense
No community defense tools were used or detected by the honeypot during this period, indicating a robust internal security setup that relied solely on built-in features and IDS systems.
Conclusion
The Raspberry Pi honeypot deployed in Spain on September 30, 2026, showed consistent activity across various attack methods including brute force attempts, web scanning, and post-exploitation activities. The system’s tarpit mechanism effectively intercepted unauthorized connections, while its built-in IDS detected and blocked numerous threats.
The lack of malware captures suggests that the honeypot was able to successfully deter and prevent attackers from executing malicious software. Despite these successes, the honeypot still requires continuous improvement in AI defense capabilities for a more comprehensive security posture against evolving cyber threats.
The deployment of this honeypot on Raspberry Pi 5 is an excellent example of how low-cost devices can be utilized effectively as both targets and defenders in cybersecurity exercises. The data provided highlights the importance of robust IDS, tarpit mechanisms, and built-in AI defense features to create a secure environment against potential threats.
This analysis was generated by qwen2.5:1.5b running locally on the Raspberry Pi 5 honeypot lab. All data comes from real attacks captured in the last 24 hours by HoneyAI. View the raw data report for complete metrics.