Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 91566946b1d8deb0
- aad3f9ba1d6740cc
- 8d969eef6ecad3c2
- 536b7dbb7f246f49
- e1c1080602763757
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 82 scanner requests from 22 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /
- /login
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
- /favicon.ico
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; CensysInspect/1.1; +https://about.censys.io/)
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/78.0.3904.108 Safari/537.36
- Hello World/1.0
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **3** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **3** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 44 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 44 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 44 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 44 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
91566946b1d8deb0 aad3f9ba1d6740cc 8d969eef6ecad3c2 536b7dbb7f246f49 e1c1080602763757 💻 Commands They Tried
cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo $_dqssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXxziIg9eLBHpgLMuakb5+BgTFB+rKJAw9u9FSTDengvS8hX1kNFS4Mjux0hJOK8rvcEmPecjdySYMb66nylAKGwCEE6WEQHmd1mUPgHwGQ0hWCwsQk13yCGPK5w6hYp5zYkFnvlC8hGmd4Ww+u97k6pfTGTUbJk14ujvcD9iUKQTTWYYjIIu5PmUux5bsZ0R4WFwdIe6+i6rBLAsPKgAySVKPRK+oRw== mdrfckr$_dq>>.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod -R go= ~/.ssh && cd ~ These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 15 de junio de 2026. Recorded 59 SSH connections and 1448 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 49 unique IPs. 44 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 44 login attempts from 9 unique IPs. Attackers executed 15 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 1448 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 40 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 82 HTTP requests from real scanners across 22 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 3 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 3 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 13408 alerts from 1102 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.