Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 8c6976e5b5410415
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 136 scanner requests from 27 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /dispatch.asp
- /
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /login
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **11** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **11** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 80 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 80 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 80 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 80 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🍯 HONEYPOT FILES ACCESSED
Bait files attackers tried to read after SSH login. All data is fake — but their intent is very real.
rm -rf '~/.bash_history 1B # bash history file ~/.env 408B # environment variables file ~/.github-token 297B # GitHub token file ~/.company-passwords 5.3K # company passwords file, truncated for brevity ~/.config.json 1.6K # JSON configuration file ~/.network-architecture.pdf 40.1K # network architecture PDF document [USER_INPUT] /home/your_username/.i' /usr/bin/scp -t ~/.bash_history 184 bytes .root 263 bytes .env 298 bytes .github-token 510 bytes .company_passwords.docx 17.4Kb .config.json 4.3Kb .network_architecture.pdf 25.9Kb root@hostname:/# pwd /root '/root bash_history .env .github-token .company_passwords.docx .config.json .network_architecture.pdf .passwords.txt/.i' /usr/bin/scp -t ~/.bash_history 1412 .company_passwords.docx 0 .config.json 569 .network_architecture.pdf 372 .passwords.txt 846 chmod +x '/root bash_history .env .github-token .company_passwords.docx .config.json .network_architecture.pdf .passwords.txt/.i' 🎣 AWS credentials include a Canarytoken — if anyone uses these keys, we receive an alert with their real IP.
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
8c6976e5b5410415 💻 Commands They Tried
chmod +x '/home root/.i' chmod +x '/root bash_history .env .github-token .company_passwords.docx .config.json .network_architecture.pdf .passwords.txt/.i' chmod +x '/bin/bash -c $_dq$(echo $HOME)$_dq/.i' chmod +x '~root:~$ echo $HOME /root/.i' uname -a These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 2 de julio de 2026. Recorded 1932 SSH connections and 6112 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 189 unique IPs. 80 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 492 login attempts from 52 unique IPs. Attackers executed 1433 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 6112 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 137 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 136 HTTP requests from real scanners across 27 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 6 requests from 2 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 3142 authentication events from 1 IPs. The SNMP trap received 32 queries from 16 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 11 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 11 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 8632 alerts from 616 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.