Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 8d969eef6ecad3c2
- 4813494d137e1631
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 156 scanner requests from 31 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /dispatch.asp
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /
- /login
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Mozilla/5.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
- Go-http-client/1.1
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **9** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **9** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 204 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 204 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 204 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 204 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
8d969eef6ecad3c2 4813494d137e1631 💻 Commands They Tried
uname -a export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | head -c 250; printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | head -c 250; printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq uname -s -m These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 4 de julio de 2026. Recorded 617 SSH connections and 9759 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 195 unique IPs. 204 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 379 login attempts from 44 unique IPs. Attackers executed 230 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 9759 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 151 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 156 HTTP requests from real scanners across 31 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 0 requests from 0 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 4324 authentication events from 1 IPs. The SNMP trap received 34 queries from 18 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 9 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 9 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 16650 alerts from 673 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.