Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 37a8eec1ce19687d
- 8c6976e5b5410415
- 3a5745a05f87ddee
- f6ee94ecb014f74f
- 9c6d405bba2db24b
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 232 scanner requests from 30 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /dispatch.asp
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /
- /login
- /tmUnblock.cgi
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Mozilla/5.0
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **9** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **9** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 256 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 256 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 256 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 256 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
37a8eec1ce19687d 8c6976e5b5410415 3a5745a05f87ddee f6ee94ecb014f74f 9c6d405bba2db24b 💻 Commands They Tried
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq uname -s -m These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 8 de julio de 2026. Recorded 760 SSH connections and 15275 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 258 unique IPs. 256 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 552 login attempts from 139 unique IPs. Attackers executed 206 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 15275 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 119 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 232 HTTP requests from real scanners across 30 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 6 requests from 2 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 8081 authentication events from 2 IPs. The SNMP trap received 33 queries from 12 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 9 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 9 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 18876 alerts from 605 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.