๐Ÿ’€ critical

Daily Threat Report

1,675 SSH Connections
1,032 Login Attempts
627 Commands Run
190 SSH Unique IPs
37,573 Protocol Events
167 Protocol IPs
142 Web Hits
30 Web Service IPs
11 Reverse Scans
11 Scan Hits

Top Passwords Tried

  1. 3a5745a05f87ddee
  2. 8294547e9fe9367f
  3. 5994471abb01112a
  4. b79606fb3afea5bd
  5. 9c6d405bba2db24b

๐ŸŒ WEB HONEYPOT โ€” HoneyAI HTTP

AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 142 scanner requests from 30 unique IPs (local, offline).

Top Paths Probed

  1. /
  2. /dispatch.asp
  3. /login
  4. /judge
  5. /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg

Top User-Agents

  1. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
  2. Go-http-client/1.1
  3. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Firefox/121.0
  4. Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
  5. Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; FlowIQLabsBot/1.0; +https://flowiq-labs.com/scanning-info)

๐Ÿ’ฅ OPERATION SPINE โ€” Reverse Port Scanning

Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **11** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **11** hosts were found with open services.

Discovered Open Ports on Attackers

๐ŸŒ45.194.67.120 Scanned at 01:47
๐ŸŒ151.243.11.52 Scanned at 01:57
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.80 Scanned at 03:51
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.176 Scanned at 04:06
๐ŸŒ64.62.156.39 Scanned at 04:39
๐ŸŒ64.62.156.40 Scanned at 05:34
๐ŸŒ141.98.83.48 Scanned at 07:43
๐ŸŒ204.76.203.15 Scanned at 08:17
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.143 Scanned at 12:48
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.154 Scanned at 13:49
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.158 Scanned at 17:24
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting
$ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h
โ†’ 304 IPs โ†’ AbuseIPDB  (community confidence scores updated)
โ†’ 304 IPs โ†’ AlienVault OTX  (pulse indicators added)
โ†’ 304 IPs โ†’ Blocklist.de  (auto-ban list updated)
โ†’ 304 IPs โ†’ DShield/SANS  (global threat feed updated)

๐Ÿคฃ ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER

Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.

๐Ÿ”‘ Hall of Shame โ€” Passwords

3a5745a05f87ddee
8294547e9fe9367f
5994471abb01112a
b79606fb3afea5bd
9c6d405bba2db24b

๐Ÿ’ป Commands They Tried

uname -s -m
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH
uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null)
cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null)
cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 )
gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null )
last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null)
filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 )
echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq
echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq
echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq
echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq
echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq
echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq
echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq
echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq
uname -a

These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.

Automated report for 12 de julio de 2026. Recorded 1675 SSH connections and 37573 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 357 unique IPs. 304 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.

SSH Activity (HoneyAI)

The SSH service received 1032 login attempts from 190 unique IPs. Attackers executed 627 commands after gaining simulated system access.

Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)

Detected 37573 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 167 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.

HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)

The web service received 142 HTTP requests from real scanners across 30 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).

MCP Agent Trap

The MCP decoy server received 12 requests from 6 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.

MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots

The MSSQL decoy received 0 authentication events from 0 IPs. The SNMP trap received 39 queries from 18 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.

Portscan Detection

Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.

AI Defense Stats

Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.

Active Defense (Operation Spine)

HoneyAI performed 11 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 11 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.

Network IDS (Suricata)

The network intrusion detection system generated 52029 alerts from 634 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.

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