๐Ÿ’€ critical

Daily Threat Report

676 SSH Connections
353 Login Attempts
317 Commands Run
22 SSH Unique IPs
13,010 Protocol Events
139 Protocol IPs
139 Web Hits
35 Web Service IPs
11 Reverse Scans
11 Scan Hits

Top Passwords Tried

  1. 8c6976e5b5410415
  2. 4813494d137e1631

๐ŸŒ WEB HONEYPOT โ€” HoneyAI HTTP

AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 139 scanner requests from 35 unique IPs (local, offline).

Top Paths Probed

  1. /dispatch.asp
  2. /
  3. /login
  4. /cli?remoting=false
  5. /clients/MyCRL

Top User-Agents

  1. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
  2. Go-http-client/1.1
  3. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
  4. Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
  5. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/124.0.0.0

๐Ÿ’ฅ OPERATION SPINE โ€” Reverse Port Scanning

Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **11** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **11** hosts were found with open services.

Discovered Open Ports on Attackers

๐ŸŒ151.243.11.52 Scanned at 01:09
๐ŸŒ65.49.1.13 Scanned at 03:25
๐ŸŒ65.49.1.12 Scanned at 03:35
๐ŸŒ65.49.1.10 Scanned at 03:35
๐ŸŒ141.98.83.48 Scanned at 07:18
๐ŸŒ94.154.43.225 Scanned at 10:52
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.154 Scanned at 11:15
๐ŸŒ194.187.176.120 Scanned at 15:53
๐ŸŒ45.194.67.120 Scanned at 16:00
๐ŸŒ172.104.211.228 Scanned at 18:07
๐ŸŒ45.205.1.70 Scanned at 19:32
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting
$ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h
โ†’ 171 IPs โ†’ AbuseIPDB  (community confidence scores updated)
โ†’ 171 IPs โ†’ AlienVault OTX  (pulse indicators added)
โ†’ 171 IPs โ†’ Blocklist.de  (auto-ban list updated)
โ†’ 171 IPs โ†’ DShield/SANS  (global threat feed updated)

๐Ÿคฃ ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER

Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.

๐Ÿ”‘ Hall of Shame โ€” Passwords

8c6976e5b5410415
4813494d137e1631

๐Ÿ’ป Commands They Tried

export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH
uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null)
cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null)
cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 )
gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null )
last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null)
filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 )
echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq
echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq
echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq
echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq
echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq
echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq
echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq
echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq
systemctl list-units --type=service --state=running 2>/dev/null | head -10
ip addr show 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^[0-9]+:' | head -5
cat /proc/version 2>/dev/null | head -1
cat /etc/shadow 2>/dev/null | head -1

These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.

Automated report for 16 de julio de 2026. Recorded 676 SSH connections and 13010 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 161 unique IPs. 171 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.

SSH Activity (HoneyAI)

The SSH service received 353 login attempts from 22 unique IPs. Attackers executed 317 commands after gaining simulated system access.

Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)

Detected 13010 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 139 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.

HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)

The web service received 139 HTTP requests from real scanners across 35 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).

MCP Agent Trap

The MCP decoy server received 9 requests from 5 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.

MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots

The MSSQL decoy received 10292 authentication events from 3 IPs. The SNMP trap received 26 queries from 18 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.

Portscan Detection

Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.

AI Defense Stats

Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.

Active Defense (Operation Spine)

HoneyAI performed 11 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 11 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.

Network IDS (Suricata)

The network intrusion detection system generated 8390 alerts from 631 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.

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