๐Ÿ’€ critical

Daily Threat Report

971 SSH Connections
542 Login Attempts
425 Commands Run
18 SSH Unique IPs
3,517 Protocol Events
124 Protocol IPs
116 Web Hits
36 Web Service IPs
15 Reverse Scans
15 Scan Hits

Top Passwords Tried

No credentials tried (0 SSH connections).

๐ŸŒ WEB HONEYPOT โ€” HoneyAI HTTP

AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 116 scanner requests from 36 unique IPs (local, offline).

Top Paths Probed

  1. /
  2. /login
  3. /SDK/webLanguage
  4. /json/
  5. /dispatch.asp

Top User-Agents

  1. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:146.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/146.0
  2. Go-http-client/1.1
  3. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
  4. Python/3.12 aiohttp/3.13.4
  5. masscan/1.3 (https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan)

๐Ÿ’ฅ OPERATION SPINE โ€” Reverse Port Scanning

Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **15** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **15** hosts were found with open services.

Discovered Open Ports on Attackers

๐ŸŒ65.49.1.51 Scanned at 02:02
๐ŸŒ65.49.1.42 Scanned at 03:01
๐ŸŒ65.49.1.38 Scanned at 03:02
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.139 Scanned at 06:29
๐ŸŒ141.98.83.48 Scanned at 07:06
๐ŸŒ18.97.5.47 Scanned at 08:07
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.167 Scanned at 08:10
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.163 Scanned at 12:00
๐ŸŒ169.58.152.86 Scanned at 12:03
๐ŸŒ95.215.0.144 Scanned at 12:25
๐ŸŒ45.194.67.120 Scanned at 16:17
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.170 Scanned at 18:02
๐ŸŒ194.164.107.6 Scanned at 18:41
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.154 Scanned at 19:53
๐ŸŒ45.205.1.70 Scanned at 20:23
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting
$ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h
โ†’ 154 IPs โ†’ AbuseIPDB  (community confidence scores updated)
โ†’ 154 IPs โ†’ AlienVault OTX  (pulse indicators added)
โ†’ 154 IPs โ†’ Blocklist.de  (auto-ban list updated)
โ†’ 154 IPs โ†’ DShield/SANS  (global threat feed updated)

๐Ÿคฃ ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER

Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.

๐Ÿ’ป Commands They Tried

export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH
uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null)
cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null)
cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 )
gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null )
last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null)
filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 )
echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq
echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq
echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq
echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq
echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq
echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq
echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq
echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq
nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | head -n 1 | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9}' || echo 'No'
nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqAttached GPUs$_dq | awk '{print $4}' && echo '' || echo 'No'

These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.

Automated report for 16 de agosto de 2026. Recorded 971 SSH connections and 3517 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 142 unique IPs. 154 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.

SSH Activity (HoneyAI)

The SSH service received 542 login attempts from 18 unique IPs. Attackers executed 425 commands after gaining simulated system access.

Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)

Detected 3517 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 124 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.

HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)

The web service received 116 HTTP requests from real scanners across 36 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).

MCP Agent Trap

The MCP decoy server received 1 requests from 1 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.

MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots

The MSSQL decoy received 19 authentication events from 1 IPs. The SNMP trap received 41 queries from 14 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.

Portscan Detection

Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.

AI Defense Stats

Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.

Active Defense (Operation Spine)

HoneyAI performed 15 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 15 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.

Network IDS (Suricata)

The network intrusion detection system generated 10810 alerts from 621 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.

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