๐Ÿ’€ critical

Daily Threat Report

1,524 SSH Connections
890 Login Attempts
627 Commands Run
19 SSH Unique IPs
8,980 Protocol Events
140 Protocol IPs
170 Web Hits
37 Web Service IPs
16 Reverse Scans
16 Scan Hits

Top Passwords Tried

No credentials tried (0 SSH connections).

๐ŸŒ WEB HONEYPOT โ€” HoneyAI HTTP

AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 170 scanner requests from 37 unique IPs (local, offline).

Top Paths Probed

  1. /
  2. /login
  3. /SDK/webLanguage
  4. /judge
  5. /..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd

Top User-Agents

  1. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:146.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/146.0
  2. Go-http-client/1.1
  3. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
  4. Mozilla/5.0
  5. Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Infrawatch/1.0; +https://infrawat.ch/)

๐Ÿ’ฅ OPERATION SPINE โ€” Reverse Port Scanning

Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **16** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **16** hosts were found with open services.

Discovered Open Ports on Attackers

๐ŸŒ218.23.125.92 Scanned at 01:30
๐ŸŒ117.251.82.25 Scanned at 01:34
๐ŸŒ64.62.156.11 Scanned at 04:50
๐ŸŒ64.62.156.10 Scanned at 04:56
๐ŸŒ64.62.156.12 Scanned at 04:56
๐ŸŒ141.98.83.48 Scanned at 07:33
๐ŸŒ45.205.1.70 Scanned at 07:44
๐ŸŒ193.163.125.75 Scanned at 12:32
๐ŸŒ195.96.139.114 Scanned at 12:33
๐ŸŒ103.121.213.170 Scanned at 12:35
๐ŸŒ45.194.67.120 Scanned at 12:46
๐ŸŒ151.243.11.52 Scanned at 13:17
๐ŸŒ194.187.176.84 Scanned at 15:33
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.149 Scanned at 15:51
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.97 Scanned at 16:01
๐ŸŒ64.89.163.154 Scanned at 20:06
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting
$ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h
โ†’ 168 IPs โ†’ AbuseIPDB  (community confidence scores updated)
โ†’ 168 IPs โ†’ AlienVault OTX  (pulse indicators added)
โ†’ 168 IPs โ†’ Blocklist.de  (auto-ban list updated)
โ†’ 168 IPs โ†’ DShield/SANS  (global threat feed updated)

๐Ÿคฃ ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER

Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.

๐Ÿ’ป Commands They Tried

export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH
uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq)
uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null)
cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null)
cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 )
gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null )
last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null)
filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 )
echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq
echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq
echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq
echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq
echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq
echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq
echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq
echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq
echo lHTrHaqF1x && cd /tmp; echo wKbVIojCPr > T7FzNiSqYO && sleep 6 &

These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.

Automated report for 17 de agosto de 2026. Recorded 1524 SSH connections and 8980 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 159 unique IPs. 168 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.

SSH Activity (HoneyAI)

The SSH service received 890 login attempts from 19 unique IPs. Attackers executed 627 commands after gaining simulated system access.

Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)

Detected 8980 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 140 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.

HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)

The web service received 170 HTTP requests from real scanners across 37 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).

MCP Agent Trap

The MCP decoy server received 6 requests from 2 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.

MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots

The MSSQL decoy received 4660 authentication events from 4 IPs. The SNMP trap received 30 queries from 19 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.

Portscan Detection

Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.

AI Defense Stats

Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.

Active Defense (Operation Spine)

HoneyAI performed 16 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 16 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.

Network IDS (Suricata)

The network intrusion detection system generated 14026 alerts from 599 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.

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