Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 8c6976e5b5410415
- 5e884898da280471
- 3d14c2d4e4ced81e
- 4d4f26369171994f
- a075d17f3d453073
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 111 scanner requests from 28 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /
- /login
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
- /hachk.php
- /SDK/webLanguage
Top User-Agents
- python
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; ModatScanner/1.2; +https://modat.io/)
- proxy-prefilter/1
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **11** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **11** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 250 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 250 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 250 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 250 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
4cc8f4d609b71735 b03ddf3ca2e714a6 83a0fe6c403bd52d e0bc60c82713f64e 915a8c08981f6e2b 💻 Commands They Tried
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}' | grep . -c nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | head -n 1 | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}' cat > /dev/shm/.X11-sess cat > /tmp/.X11-sess These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 25 de agosto de 2026. Recorded 1249 SSH connections and 25262 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 256 unique IPs. 250 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 663 login attempts from 128 unique IPs. Attackers executed 580 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 25262 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 128 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 111 HTTP requests from real scanners across 28 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 6 requests from 2 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 0 authentication events from 0 IPs. The SNMP trap received 21 queries from 17 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 11 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 11 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 64479 alerts from 656 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.